

Dealing with the East – a View from the Heart of Europe

Intervention de Stefan Füle / Chaire des Grands Enjeux Stratégiques Cycle 2017

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me first thank you for giving me this unique opportunity to be a part of the 2017 session of the International Chair “Great Contemporary Strategic Issues” devoted to “The Russian strategic Challenge”. I would like to offer to you my views on this issue under the heading: “Dealing with the East – a view from the Heart of Europe”. And when I am saying my views I mean to reflect in particular my previous occupation as the European Commissioner for the Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, and my current status – being one of the four candidates for the post of the Secretary General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Ambassador Samantha Power, former US Permanent Representative to the United Nation wrote for NYT an article on Vitalij Churkin, her former Russian colleague, after his unexpected death. In that article, she underlined: “Our security depends on our ability to reach across ideological divides – to understand one another, but also to try to solve problems together”. There is hardly a better expression of what I am going to talk about today.

With the fall of Iron Curtain, we have left bipolar World behind us, but the multipolar one is still out of our reach. We live in an interim period which could last quite long. The international institutions are still to be reformed to fit in the new world. And almost daily we observe relativization of transparent, predictable and sustainable international order as we know and as we prefer it. Globalization has become real instrument of interconnections and interdependence, and it started to test the concept of borders as a line of defence of our way of life. And there is growing competition among governance systems and sets of values. The competition which has challenged European security most seriously.

For years, we were trying through international efforts to find a proper solution for the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo. But that has been sui generis case to await hopefully its final settlement in the framework of the EU enlargement. At the same time we have not been able to reconcile balance between the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the principle of self-determination of peoples through international mechanisms in other cases, like the ones of Nagorno Karabakh, Transnistria or Georgia. And the case of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine has pushed all of us in Europe to a very dangerous path. There are grave consequences for the security on our continent if we decide to rebalance these two principles outside of international efforts, outside of very often difficult diplomatic negotiations, which is the only one to bring sustainable solution. And situation gets even more unpredictable if principle of refraining from the threat or use of force is being played with.

How come we have different interpretations of the meaning of these important principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975? Why do we differ in our interpretation on fully recognizing freedom of States to choose their own security arrangements and indivisibility of security of

every participating State of the OSCE as agreed here in Paris in 1990 in Charter of Paris for a New Europe? Why do we have apparently different approaches to what we have agreed to here in Paris, that “all the Ten Principles of the Helsinki Final Act apply equally and unreservedly, each of the being interpreted taking into account the others”?

But there are other important questions we better know objective answers to, to be able to move forward after reflecting on lessons learnt. President Putin was quoted to say during the press conference on 10 December 2004 the following: “If Ukraine wants to join the EU and if the EU accepts Ukraine as a member, Russia, I think, would welcome this because we have a special relationship with Ukraine. Our economies are closely linked, including in specific areas of manufacturing sector where we have a very high level of cooperation, and having this part of our economy becoming essentially part of the EU would, I hope, have a positive impact on Russia’s economy.” Only nine years on his economic adviser, Mr. Glazyev, said: “Association Agreement will have catastrophic consequences for Ukraine and Russia-Ukraine relations”. Encouraging remark on membership and later very critical remark on association partnership.

How come at the time the EU strengthened capacities in external relations its normative power has been seen as never before more promising by some and more threatening by others? At the same time, right of independent European states to make sovereign choices in taking over EU norms has never been challenged since the end of cold war. What has happened? What has brought upon us the most serious crisis of European security in the last decades?

Ladies and Gentlemen,

There is no agreed view, no common analysis to understand how the current crisis developed, and what errors and missteps may have been made on the way. This lack of agreement is reflected not just in two but in the three different narratives included in the Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project. The Panel was mandated to provide advice on how to reconsolidate European security as a common project and was launched on the initiative of the 2014 Swiss OSCE Chairmanship in close co-operation with Serbia and Germany at the OSCE Ministerial Council 2014 in Basel on 4 December.

Three different narratives are often in opposition to each other and are not necessarily an accurate or adequate way of describing their perspective. The point, however, is not historical accuracy but to illustrate how much our appreciation of the recent past diverges. These diametrically opposed narratives are a fact that, for the moment, we must live with, members of the Panel argue. While it should not prevent us from working together, it ought to help us realize how difficult that is.

First. The view from the West. The end of the Cold War brought the liberation of Central and Eastern European countries from Soviet domination. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, which came about through the determination of its constituent republics to become independent states, extended this liberation to the countries that had been incorporated in the Soviet and Russian empires. This was not a victory of the West but a victory for freedom and democracy, and was recorded as such in the Charter of Paris.

This was an opportunity for the creation of a Europe that was whole and free, democratic and at peace. For newly-liberated countries, that meant joining the Western institutions – both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) – and transforming their economic and political systems. A strategic partnership with Russia that would include co-operation with, if not necessarily integration in, these Western institutions was intended to bring stability and co-operation to Europe. This process resulted in the successful enlargements of NATO and the EU in the 1990s and 2000s – enlargements that Russia accepted.

Enlargement became increasingly controversial when membership questions arose for the former Soviet republics, with Russia increasingly opposed, the West divided and beset with enlargement fatigue, and some of the countries seeking membership were poorly governed.

The process of creating a Europe whole, free, and at peace was challenged by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the conflicts that emerged in the wake of the Soviet break-up. The West was unprepared for the crisis in the Balkans and failed to prevent or resolve the conflict initially. Addressing this crisis brought the West into conflict with Russia. The first crisis between Russia and the West over Bosnia was overcome through inclusion in the diplomatic process; but this did not succeed in the case of Kosovo nor with conflicts in former Soviet republics.

When democratic revolutions took place in some countries that had been part of the Soviet Union, conflict between the West and Russia (which feared the “colour revolutions” would spread, including to Moscow) grew. After crisis in Georgia in 2008, open confrontation arose over Ukraine from 2013. According to the report of the Panel, whatever concerns Russia may have had about Ukraine, including Crimea, it made no attempt to resolve them peacefully.

Second. The view from Moscow according to Panel views. The main dynamic after the Cold War was the expansion of Western institutions at the expense of Russia. The West never tried to address security with Russia, only without it, or against it. NATO’s expansion was an increasing threat to Russia’s national security. The EU’s expansion took over Russia’s markets; and as new member states joined Schengen, the area of visa-free travel available to Russian citizens was reduced. In each case, as compensation, Russia was offered a junior partnership: the NATO-Russia Council was sugar coating for the bitter pill of enlargement; the EU’s idea of partnership was that Russia should adopt the EU’s rules.

The idea of NATO as a benign, defensive alliance ended with its bombing of Serbia – a traditional partner of Russia. This was a breach both of international law and of the Helsinki principles. The West involved Russia in the negotiations that preceded this, but when no agreement was reached, acted unilaterally. This was followed by another open breach of international law in the US-led invasion of Iraq. This used military power for regime change. Having created turmoil in the Middle East, the West has continued to pursue regime change there, supporting the popular movements of the “Arab Spring”, and using force, as in Libya. The West gave active support to the colour revolutions in Europe. Abrogating the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty destroyed one of the pillars of co-operative security in Europe. Russia made its views known on all these subjects but no one listened. Instead, a negative propaganda campaign was launched against Russia in 2013 and Western leaders boycotted the Sochi

Olympics.

All these elements came together first in Georgia and then in Ukraine, the promise of NATO membership at the Summit in Bucharest – a serious threat to Russian security – without even a pretence of consultation; then the attempt by the EU to increase its economic space at the expense of Russia; and finally, Western support for the Maidan regime change movement. Russia responded in the only language that gets Western attention.

And Third. The view from the States in between. These states do not share either of the above narratives fully. Some of these states (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) saw their independence as an opportunity for integration into Western institutions, as the Baltic States and Central and Eastern European States had. These three states are going through a transition, with more or less democratic elections and functioning civil societies. But they continue to see Russia as a threat to their security, willing to use all means, including force, to prevent them establishing themselves as successful and independent states with autonomy in foreign policy.

Other states in the same region have accepted Russia's political and security pre-eminence, or have decided not to align with either the West or Russia, as an alternative route to maintaining security and independence.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me share with you my side of the story and that of my close colleagues, ideas behind and my perception of events unfolding. And I will try to make a hint where we should go when it comes to Eurasian dimension of European security.

Following the dissolution of the USSR the EU developed concept of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA). These PCAs were designed as comprehensive agreements, governing the entirety of the EU's relations with the "countries of the former Soviet Union". The PCAs helped to normalise and develop relations across many fields with newly independent states, of which none had any relations with the EU before.

The aim of these agreements was to strengthen the democratic and economic development of the partner countries through cooperation in some selected policy areas and a suitable framework for political dialogue. The partnerships aimed to provide a basis for cooperation in a number of fields. The PCAs with Ukraine, Russia and Moldova also provided already the prospect of setting up in the future free trade areas. The idea was to accompany the transition of the partner countries to a market economy and to encourage trade and investment.

Ten years after the signature of these PCAs, the geographic scope of the EU changed dramatically, affecting also the geopolitics of the European continent. After the two enlargements of 2004 and 2007, the EU found itself suddenly in a situation where it shared direct borders not only with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia, but the new Member States bordering the Black Sea also linked the EU to the countries in the South Caucasus.

Shortly before the major enlargement to the East became a reality, then President of the European Commission Romano Prodi coined the key terms for a new European neighbourhood policy (ENP) by stating that the countries around the EU, from Morocco and the Mediterranean, to the Black Sea and to Russia and Ukraine, should form an “arc of stability” and “a ring of friends” with the ability to participate in the various EU policies and programmes (“everything but institutions”).

Russia was supposed to be part of the ENP. The European Commission made this explicit by sending the predecessor of my predecessor to Moscow in October 2003. Commissioner Verheugen underlined that “Russian participation in our neighbourhood policy forms an obvious and integral part of such an approach”. But Russia declined the EU’s invitation to take part in the ENP. Instead, the “Common Spaces” for EU-Russia cooperation were established at the EU- Russia Summit in November 2003.

There are various attempts to explain Russia’s refusal to be part of the ENP. The most relevant reason, probably, is that Russia did not want to become “object” of an EU policy, but rather be “subject” based on equality and reciprocity at a level of a strategic partner. This is reflected in the four Common Spaces and the related detailed Roadmaps of action, adopted at the EU-Russia Summit in May 2005. A new impetus for EU-Russia relations was also intended with the launch of negotiations of a “New Agreement” in 2008 which was meant to replace the earlier PCA and to provide for a strengthened legal basis and legally binding commitments covering all main areas of EU-Russia relations. To complement the negotiation and building on results achieved under the Common Spaces approach so far, in 2010 the Partnership for Modernisation was launched, serving as a flexible framework for promoting reform, enhancing growth and raising competitiveness.

In sum, while there had been one policy of the EU towards its Eastern continental neighbours following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the first decade of the 2000s saw an increased deviation between EU-Russian relations on the one side and a specific policy towards Eastern neighbours on the other side.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The ENP had been created, as mentioned earlier, in anticipation of the 2004 enlargement round (10 new member states), in order to provide a framework for the EU’s relations with its new neighbours. While 2004 enlargement represented an important step towards reunification of Europe, main idea behind the ENP was not to move dividing line from Central Europe towards new external borders of the EU, particularly in the Eastern Europe. At the same time the dual policies of enlargement and ENP were conceptualised as distinct EU strategies and the clear differentiation between the two became at the same time more ambiguous. The ENP provided the opportunity to develop privileged political and economic relations with a degree of integration going beyond normal cooperation with third countries, but stopping short of enlargement. Thus, the ENP did not attempt to address the issue of possible future membership, but left it simply open for Member States as well as neighbouring countries to interpret the “finalité” of the ENP according to national interests.

The emphasis of the ENP was on new forms of cooperation and related financial assistance. New contractual commitments to anchor the new neighbouring countries closer to the EU were already envisaged. Given that the Mediterranean neighbours of the EU already had Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (except Syria and Libya), the possibility of obtaining new contractual commitments was most relevant for the eastern neighbours. Subsequently, the European Commission proposed a negotiation mandate for a new agreement with Ukraine in 2006. In 2008, following Ukraine's accession to the World Trade Organization, the EU and Ukraine also launched negotiations on a Free Trade Area, later upgraded and called a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, as a core element of the new agreement.

In 2008, the EU's relations with its neighbours were driven by the national interest of some Member States. After the re-launch of its relations to the South with the establishment of the "Union pour la Méditerranée" under French Presidency in 2008, a new initiative for the East followed: the Eastern Partnership (EaP).

Eastern Partnership, agreed in 2008 supported the aspirations of the eastern neighbours (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) for closer ties with the EU, basing the EU's commitment on strict conditionality – especially regarding progress made by partner countries in the areas of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The Commission underlined that the EU's ambitions for the relationship would depend on the extent to which these European values are respected and implemented in each country. This approach was emphasised later as the "more for more" principle.

The EU proposed, as mentioned above, to upgrade the contractual relations with the partner countries by launching a new generation of Association Agreements. Similarly, following on from the Georgia crisis, the leaders of the EU and Ukraine agreed at the EU-Ukraine Summit here in Paris in 2008 that the PCA should be replaced by an Association Agreement. Ukraine therefore became the frontrunner but also a test case for the EU's new approach of shaping its relations with its Eastern neighbours.

The negotiations on the AA with Ukraine were going to take no less than five years. This process responded also to a strong wish by the Ukrainian side to significantly upgrade its relations with the EU in the wake of the eastward enlargements of 2004 and 2007. Backed by large popular support in favour of European integration, the Ukrainian leadership's main aim with the AA was to obtain the promise of a European perspective for Ukraine. Thus, the Ukrainian negotiators' aim was to prepare for an agreement which was as ambitious as possible in terms of scope and in terms of political ambition as the EU Agreements with Central European states. It was considered by Ukraine that such an approach would prepare the way to move to the next political step in the future: EU accession negotiations. But as it has been stated earlier this long-term ambition was left explicitly open, due to the EU's Member States' division over that question.

The EU's negotiators but also the relevant Eastern Partners followed the Ukraine negotiation precedent and, as of 2010, the negotiations on Association Agreements with Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan started.

The EU's Association Agreements (AA) with the Eastern Partnership countries are designed to constitute a new stage in the development of the contractual relations between both sides. The most important innovation within the AA is the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) which goes beyond a traditional FTA and offers gradual integration with the EU's Internal Market. As a medium and long-term objective, it is intended to base trade between the EU and EaP countries largely on the same conditions as between EU Member States.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

You know the rest of the story. We started negotiations with four partners but signed only three of the Association Agreements. Armenia decided to become a part of the Eurasian Economic Union. Territorial integrity of two out of three AA members, Georgia and Moldova, was challenged well before we started negotiations and irony was, that Ukraine fell in that "category" the very same date when it signed the Association Agreement.

AA/DCFTA have not been designed to lead to new dividing lines on our continent, but to promote additional economic opportunities without severing traditional ties. Considering the origins and motivations of the EU's Eastern Partnership policy as well as the actual content of the EU's Association Agreements with its Eastern partners and their economic impact on Russia, it is clear that all of these developments were unintended consequences.

Despite all of that we need to look seriously at the lessons learned. Let me enumerate those I consider the most important:

- 1/** We had our policy towards our Eastern partners ambitious and consensual. Unfortunately, the same could not be said about our policy towards Russia. Having this clear policy vis-à-vis our neighbors but failing to promote similarly ambitious and consensual policy towards the neighbors of our neighbors has deepen mistrust rather than promoted trust.
- 2/** We have not been always consistent. In case of the NATO enlargement we were ready to show the light at the end of the tunnel but not the path to reach it. In case of the EU enlargement we have showed the path but not the light.
- 3/** In case of Ukraine we have been absorbed by our own hesitation whether to sign the AA in the light of failure of the Ukrainian leadership at that time to deliver on the conditionality particular in the area of rule of law rather than being able to see any hesitation on Ukrainian side.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me also tackle some of the myths surrounding our policy towards our Eastern partners and Russia. The **first myth** was that we did not talk to Russia. It is fair to say that Russia has not paid attention for many years the possible impact of the EU's Eastern Partnership policy on Russia's relations with its own neighbours. Russia was rather focussed on its own new regional integration scheme. Back in 2004, President Putin welcomed the idea of Ukraine's EU accession and indirectly even hinted that this would have a positive impact on Russia's economy and I referred to that earlier. And when Russia reacted, it was too late to influence the substance of the new Association Agreements in a realistic and sustainable way. But already in 2012, we established EaP Information and Coordination Group with many interested third countries and donors participating in its work. Twice a year we organized

briefings openly informing about the progress of our work on association partnership. Russia was part of that.

In March 2013, during the last meeting so far between the European Commission and the Russian government, which took place in Moscow, we have made three important points and proposals:

First, we made it clear that AA and membership in the Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Union were not compatible. We underlined that this lack of compatibility was not a result of some political games pursued by us but rather a technical issue reflecting different legal nature of both commitments.

Second, we stressed that we want our AA partners to continue to promote traditional relations with Russia in all spheres. We added, that despite first point we would be ready to support our AA partners to become part of any policy of the Customs Union which would not be in conflict with their obligation stemming from the AA.

And third, we called on Russia to see a bigger picture, to arrange the relationship between the two European integration project – the European Union and Customs Union/EAEU. We underlined that if we let both projects to follow their own distinctive regulatory frameworks without any attempt to harmonize them or at least make them compatible, we could create gradually new dividing line in Europe, this time based on different economy and trade regulations. We proposed to launch pilot projects in a number of the most relevant fields to ensure such a compatibility. There was, however, no response.

Following the calls to hold trilateral consultations between Ukraine, Russia and the EU, several EU-Russia consultations at expert and at senior official level have taken place between October 2013 and March 2014. The EU also agreed to hold ministerial level meetings in trilateral format dealing with the implementation aspects of the DCFTA. However, none of these meetings have alleviated Russian concerns. This became in particular apparent at the January 2014 EU-Russia summit, which took place in a notably stilted atmosphere in light of recent developments. However, the Summit also recalled the shared longer-term vision of creating a common economic area between the EU and Russia, for which it was agreed to first relaunch the negotiations on the New Agreement.

The **second myth** was that Association Agreements were invented as instrument against the Customs Union, predecessor of the Eurasian Economic Union. However, the creation of the Customs Union and the announcement of the Eurasian Economic Union happened after negotiations on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement had begun (March 2007) and the final deal on the Agreement made (October 2011). Prior to August 2013, when the Russian trade restricting customs measures suddenly started, Russia had not formally raised any particular concerns in relation to the AA. And at no time did the Ukrainian side, independent of who was in power, ever call into doubt its intention to associate with the EU. Concerns seemingly existed earlier, which is best reflected in a study issued by the Russian-financed Eurasian Development Bank. This study, which was made available to the EU only in summer 2013, concludes that Ukraine's AA with the EU would have a severe negative impact on the Russian economy, notably "deterioration of the terms of trade throughout the post-Soviet area".

The creation of the Customs Union in 2010 with Belarus and Kazakhstan and the launch of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, joined by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, with its Single Economic Space, closely modelled along the EU's integration experience, have become the Russian President's main answer and his top foreign policy priority.

Third and final myth I would like to mention was that we made our Eastern partners to choose between Moscow or Brussels. The EU has always respected free choices of countries wishing to join the Customs Union/EAEU, as it has shown in reaction to Armenia's wish to join that Union and not to pursue the AA/DCFTA with the EU anymore. The EU did not adopt any restrictive measures against Armenia as a result of its decision. On the contrary, the EU already at Vilnius summit in 2013 signed a Memorandum with Armenia committing to launch negotiation of a new agreement which would respect Armenian commitments stemming from its membership in the Customs Union/EAEU.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Our ultimate interests and goal remain the same – to promote political stability together with economic prosperity and to avoid creation of new dividing line in Europe. We all have responsibility here. Responsibility for finding a right answer to a question how to proceed with our goal not to push our partners all around to choose between Moscow or Brussels making them to pay for consequences of such a move.

There is an obvious need for better cooperation with Russia in the medium-term. The more progress that can be achieved towards a Common Economic Area with Russia or even the Customs Union, the less tension should exist in the relationship with Russia, by complementing each other's strengths and weaknesses and by building on mutual interdependence. Teaming up would make both the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union stronger for future global competition necessities. To achieve possible economic integration with another European integration process, a very similar method as the one already pursued with EaP partners could be used, since the members of the EAEU seems to aim at somehow similar policy goals as the EU in terms of economic integration. This was outlined already in November 2011 by Putin himself when he presented his vision of an FTA from "Lisbon to Vladivostok".

According to the factsheet for EU-Russia Summit of 28 January 2014 "Some progress has been made in the negotiations [of the New Agreement] and both sides have on several occasions reiterated that they would like to develop even deeper cooperation and economic integration between the EU and Russia – and lay the foundations for a future common economic space from the Atlantic to the Pacific". Barroso, former President of the EC, after what happened to be the last the EU-Russia Summit so far, said "Another way to reinforce our trust is to work jointly in one of our most important strategic and shared objectives: to create a common economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok. It may seem a dream, but dreams can become reality".

This will however require that all the members join the World Trade Organization and that all will live up to their WTO commitments. It will also require that all Euro Asian Economic Union

members demonstrate willingness to undertake significant and comprehensive trade and investment liberalising steps, to fulfil WTO criteria for an FTA.

However, there is one clear condition for the EU in pursuing such an approach in the longer term particularly when it comes to a political level. The quotations I referred to earlier were made before the Russian Federation unilaterally decided to make Crimea and Sevastopol part of its territory. There need to be a full implementation of the Minsk agreements. That being the first step we need then to move to the second step – making gradual but tangible steps towards practical cooperation and some form of contractual arrangement between the two Unions. I already talked about a possible consequence of us not harmonizing or making compatible the respective regulatory frameworks of the two European integration projects. Last year, for the first time the EAEU had a bigger trade volume exchange with China and Asia than the one with Europe. It is in our interests to reverse this trend and make sure that we have pragmatic and mutually beneficial cooperation with EAEU to deal with China and Asian market rather than the other way around.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

There are difficult choices to be made. Some of us should accept and respect different narratives and perceptions as a basis for a genuine dialogue. Some others should realize that raising new dividing lines in Europe creates but a mirage of stability, haunting, sooner or later, the very creators of the imposed divisions. Our effort would be hardly sustainable if in its foundation, we would not exercise the determination to restore respect for the fundamental principles and commitments enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and the Paris Charter later in 1990.

“A cornerstone of the existing international order,” as Javier Solana recently wrote, “is the recognition that maintaining peace and human welfare requires an understanding of and respect for the needs and interests of others – needs and interests that are no less legitimate than our own. Multilateralism is not a product of unsustainable solidarity, as some like to claim; it is the result of an enlightened interpretation of one’s own interests. With a constructive attitude, even a large number of disparate actors can reach agreements in which everyone wins by yielding a little; without it, prospects for sustained peace and widely shared prosperity become far bleaker.”

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In conclusion, you may ask whether there is anything new about all this. Yes, there is. It is the cost and consequences of not doing anything or not doing enough, as we are not the only player. Only too often we have failed to act because we were not sure about consequences. Or, we were not confident about the right balance between efforts and resources to be mobilized on one side and results it could produce on the other. Or, and that could have been the worst, we often lack courage and creativity to move beyond the mistakes we occasionally make to face the current challenges in a proactive way. There are important shared values and principles which define who we are and how do we behave. Our strength is not in compromising on them but rather in our ability to become empowered by them in reaching out to other actors and partners.

“We live in age of chaos,” said Federica Mogherini during her last visit to Prague, “and it is up to us to turn this age of chaos into cooperation and create with our partners a shape of what kind of world order we would prefer”.

And one more sentence: “Light the candle rather than curse the darkness,” I would quote the British Queen as saying.

Thank you for your attention.